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Abstract
The city of Timbuktu evokes remoteness and, since 2012, chaos and destruction.
During an armed conflict in the north of Mali, radicals took over the city and
destroyed several of its mausoleums. One of the perpetrators, Ahmad Al Faqi Al
Mahdi, was convicted at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for his participation
in the destruction of 10 religious and historic buildings. The unprecedented nature of
the Al Mahdi case led to an equally unprecedented question at the reparations phase:
who are the victims of cultural heritage destruction and how should their harm be
addressed? Drawing from the author’s personal involvement in the case as an
appointed expert, this article is a journey into how this question was resolved and
the practical challenges it posed during the implementation phase. These challenges,
while specific to the Al Mahdi case, provide a framework to demonstrate the level of
complexity involved in the implementation of reparations. The article focuses on three
‘monumental’ challenges: (i) whether ‘unborn children’ should be included in the pool
of victims given that cultural heritage is meant to be preserved for the benefit of
future generations; (ii) what place women ought to occupy in the implementation of
reparations, despite the customary practices of side-lining them; and (iii) the decision
of whether to memorialize events surrounding the crime. On the latter challenge, the
article introduces the concept of ‘restorative agency’, a working principle that was
adopted to ensure memorialization practices reflect the experience of victims.
Incidentally, this article reveals some of the work of the Trust Fund for Victims,
one of the ICC’s least comprehended creations, and briefly discusses the role of
experts during implementation moving forward.
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The case against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (Mr Al Mahdi) before the
International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) is the first, and so far, the
only one that has revolved exclusively around the war crime of intentionally
directing attacks against religious and historic buildings, pursuant to Article
8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute. The affected properties were nine mausoleums
and the door of the Sidi Yahia mosque (the protected buildings) in the world
heritage town of Timbuktu (Mali). This meant that, once a conviction was
entered against Mr Al Mahdi, the Court had to order and implement repar-
ations on the basis of a bloodless crime. At that stage, the Court faced a
question that had never been addressed before at the judicial level: who are
the victims of cultural heritage destruction and how should their harm be
repaired? Trial Chamber VIII navigated this uncharted territory and issued
an order for reparations in August 20171 in which it determined that there
had been four concentric groups of victims, from broader to narrower: (i) the
international community; (ii) the Malian population; (iii) the local population
of Timbuktu; and, within it, (iv) certain individuals with a more acute eco-
nomic and/or moral connection to the destroyed protected buildings.2
There are a number of commentaries on the Al Mahdi case which, for in-
stance, offer an overview of the criminal trial;3 problematize certain aspects of
the criminal prosecution;4 assess the reparations order5 or its reported human
rights influence;6 and delve into the layers of meaning of the notion ‘cultural
property’ within the ICC.7 On reparations alone, there is a fair amount of
attention paid to the ICC,8 and a growing frustration with what it has
1 Reparations Order, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-236), Trial Chamber VIII, 17 August 2017 (‘Al
Mahdi Reparations Order’).
2 Al Mahdi Reparations Order, § 51.
3 P. Casaly, ‘Al Mahdi before the ICC: Cultural Property and World Heritage in International
Criminal Law’, 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2016) 1199–1220; M. Sterio,
‘Individual Criminal Responsibility for the Destruction of Religious and Historic Buildings: The
Al Mahdi Case’, 45 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (CWRJIL) (2017) 63–73.
4 W. Schabas, ‘Al Mahdi Has Been Convicted of a Crime He Did Not Commit’, 45 CWRJIL (2017)
75–102; M. Lostal, ‘The Misplaced Emphasis on the Intangible Dimension of Cultural Heritage
in the Al Mahdi Case at the ICC’, 1 Inter Gentes - The McGill Journal of International Law & Legal
Pluralism (2017) 45–58.
5 F. Capone, ‘An Appraisal of the Al Mahdi Order on Reparations and Its Innovative Elements:
Redress for Victims of Crimes against Cultural Heritage’, 16 JICJ (2018) 645–661.
6 H.J. Dijkstal, ‘Destruction of Cultural Heritage before the ICC: The Influence of Human Rights
on Reparations Proceedings for Victims and the Accused’, 17 JICJ (2019) 391–412.
7 M.A. Drumbl, ‘From Timbuktu to The Hague and Beyond: The War Crime of Intentionally
Attacking Cultural Property’, 17 JICJ (2019) 77–99.
8 C. McCarthy, Reparations and Victims Support in the International Criminal Court (Cambridge
University Press, 2012); L. Moffett, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court
(Routledge, 2014); L. Moffett, ‘Reparations for Victims at the International Criminal Court: A
New Way Forward?’ 21 The International Journal of Human Rights (2017) 1204–1222; M. Goetz,
‘Victims’ Experiences of the International Criminal Court’s Reparations Mandate in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo’, in C. Ferstman, and M. Goetz (eds), Reparations for
Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (2nd edn., Brill – Nijhoff, 2019)
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achieved so far.9 The existing literature has mostly focused on outputs, such as
decisions, progress reports, numbers and timelines. However, it could not but
overlook an important part of the process of implementing reparations to
which the Al Mahdi case bears witness: the recurrence of theoretically complex
questions with wide-reaching practical implications for the victims and for the
future practice of the Court.
The reason why this aspect of reparations has not been discussed before is
because the heavily confidential and/or redacted nature of proceedings at the
implementation stage make it practically invisible. This article is, however,
written by an academic who worked in the backstage of the reparations in
the Al Mahdi case for several years10 and witnessed how these issues, far from
being anecdotal, constitute a constant element in the implementation of rep-
arations. Without disclosing any confidential information, the article focuses
on three challenges the Al Mahdi reparations posed, namely: (i) whether ‘un-
born children’ should be included in the pool of victims resulting from the
destruction given that cultural heritage law is premised on the idea that cul-
tural heritage should be preserved for the benefit of future generations; (ii)
what place women ought to occupy in the implementation of reparations
despite the customary practices of side-lining them; and (iii) the decision of
whether to memorialize or not to memorialize events surrounding the crime of
destruction of cultural heritage. On the latter point, the article explains the
concept of ‘restorative agency’, a working principle the Trust Fund for Victims
(TFV) adopted aiming to impact the future of memorialization measures by
making sure that such decisions are only based on the will of victims, not that
of the Court, or of any other alien institution.
The contribution of this article lies in offering a more complete picture of the
process that occurs before reparations are reflected into a decision, progress
report, number or timeline. The challenges analysed in this paper, while spe-
cific to the Al Mahdi case, also provide a framework to highlight latent tensions
in the Court’s reparative legal framework, the nature of the work carried out
by the TFV — one of the Court’s least comprehended creations —11 and reflect
on the use of experts during the implementation of reparations.
415–445; C. Ferstman, ‘Reparations at the ICC: the Need for a Human Rights Based Approach
to Effectiveness’, in Ferstman and Goetz (eds), ibid., 446–478; L. Moffett and C. Sandoval,
‘Tilting at Windmills: Reparations and the International Criminal Court’, 34 Leiden Journal of
International Law (LJIL) (2021) 749–769.
9 See e.g. REDRESS, ‘No time to wait: realizing reparations for victims before the International
Criminal Court’ (21 February 2019), available online at https://redress.org/news/no-time-to-
wait-realising-the-right-to-reparations-for-victims-before-the-international-criminal-court/ (vis-
ited 16 September 2021).
10 First, as an expert appointed by Trial Chamber VIII during the reparations proceedings in 2017
and, later on, assisting the TFV in the implementations phase between 2018 and 2020 as a
’reparations expert’. This article is written in the author’s personal capacity.
11 Critical appraisals of the work of the Trust Fund for Victims have recently increased, see R.E.
Rauxloh, ‘Good Intentions and Bad Consequences: The General Assistance Mandate of the
Trust Fund for Victims of the ICC’, 34 LJIL (2020) 203–222; Moffett and Sandoval, supra
note 8. Until then, most of the literature focused on the legal framework of the Trust Fund
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Section 2 briefly describes the history of Timbuktu, the connection of the
local population with the town’s cultural heritage, and Mr Al Mahdi’s role in
its destruction. Section 3 briefly analyses who the Trial Chamber considered
victims of the destruction of cultural heritage in the Al Mahdi case. Section 4
discusses three of the monumental challenges faced in designing the imple-
mentation of reparations in Timbuktu. The conclusion makes some observa-
tions on the nature of the challenges faced in the implementation of
reparations, and the potential use of experts moving forward.
2. Timbuktu
A. Brief Historical Overview
The fascinating history of Timbuktu means that the mere mention of its
name evokes legends, remoteness and camel caravan expeditions. Among
its many mysteries, one relates to its origin.12 The dominant theory in
written sources is that Timbuktu was established in the 11th century by
a Tuareg tribe that wandered outside its base, leaving a servant to look after
the children and possessions in this new location. The servant went by the
name Buktu, or ‘old woman’ in the local language.13 Merchants started to
use this area as a storage depot,14 which they called ‘Tin-Buktu’, that is,
the place of Buktu.
From an improvised settlement, Timbuktu went on to become, as the
saying goes, the ‘Rome of the Sudan and the Mecca of the Sahara’.15 By
the 15th century, Timbuktu had entered its Golden Era. It served as a
hotspot where merchants would meet and trade with books, gold from
the West and salt from the East.16 However, what rendered Timbuktu
for Victims, see e.g. D. Donat-Cattin, ‘Article 75’, in O. Triffterer, and K. Ambos (eds), The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2018); see also, M.
Cohen, Realizing Reparative Justice for International Crimes: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge
University Press, 2020), 126–149; or predated the practice of reparations, see e.g. P. De Greiff
and M. Wierda, ‘The Trust Fund for Victims of the International Criminal Court: Between
Possibilities and Constraints’, in K. de Feyter et al. (eds), Out of the Ashes: Reparation for
Victims of Gross and Systematic Violations of Human Rights (Intersentia, 2005); see also H.
Rombouts, and S. Parmentier, ‘The International Criminal Court and its Trust Fund are
Coming of Age: Towards a Process Approach for the Reparation of Victims’, 16 International
Review of Victimology (2009) 149–182.
12 E.N. Saad, Social History of Timbuktu: The Role of Muslim Scholars and Notables, 1400–1900
(Cambridge University Press, 1983), at 3.
13 A. Es Sadi, Tarikh es Soudan (Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient, reprinted in 1981), at 36. The
local language was probably Tamasheq or a dialect deriving from it.
14 Ibid., see also, R.L. Smith, ‘The Image of Timbuktu in Europe before Caillié’, 8 Proceedings of the
Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society (1985) 12–22, at 13.
15 See e.g. Embassy of Mali in Canada, Tombouctou, available online at https://ambamali.ca/en/
tombouctou-2/ (visited on 12 September 2020).
16 R. Mansell Prothero, ‘Heinrich Barth and the Western Sudan’, 124 The Geographical Journal
(1958) 326–337.
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unique was not its wealth, which was by all accounts extraordinary,17 but
rather its intellectual and spiritual character.18 Unlike other rich cities,
Timbuktu was full of judges, doctors and imams who were paid by the
king and where handwritten books were traded. It was home to the
University of Sankoré and to more than a hundred madrassas attracting
thousands of students and where ‘[s]cholars, engineers, and architects
from various regions in Africa rubbed shoulders with wise men and mar-
abouts’.19 Many of these scholars, due to their acquired knowledge through
study or divine inspiration, are considered Saints and are believed to be
buried in the town’s mausoleums, thus contributing to Timbuktu’s reputa-
tion as the city of the 333 Saints.
News of Timbuktu reached North Africa and Europe through accounts of the
1324 pilgrimage of Mansa Musa, a Malian king. On his way to Mecca, he
attracted much attention as he travelled through Egypt with a caravan of tens
of thousands of camels, servants and soldiers dressed in silk and carrying what,
until then, were unseen amounts of gold.20 Hence, the rumours of an African
‘El Dorado’ began. In 1550, the rumours became legend through the writings
of Leo Africanus.21 It was believed that all gold in Africa originated from
Timbuktu because, if not, what else could explain the blossoming of a trade
centre in the middle of the Sahara?
Timbuktu began to suffer its demise — from which it never recovered —
in 1591 with the fall of the Songhai Empire to the Moroccans.22 However,
news from Africa did not travel particularly fast back then and, for more
than 200 years, Europeans continued to think of Timbuktu as a place
where even the roofs were made out of gold. During this time, many
explorers tried to reach the city, but all of them failed and many even
perished in the attempt,23 until 1828. In that year, René Caillié became
the first European to make it back alive to break the disappointing news
about Timbuktu.24 He famously described his arrival to the city saying ‘I
looked around and found that the sight before me did not answer my
17 B.A. Tor, G. Berge, and E. Dugan, ‘Myths of Timbuktu: From African El Dorado to
Desertification’, 34 International Journal of Political Economy (2004) 31–59.
18 Saad, supra note 12, at 18.
19 International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), ‘World Heritage List, nº 119 Rev’
(July 1988), at 1.
20 Boston University Pardee School of Global Studies – African Studies Center, ‘Kingdom of Mali
Primary Sources’, available online at http://www.bu.edu/africa/outreach/teachingresources/his
tory/k_o_mali/ (visited on 20 November 2020).
21 G. Battista Ramusio, Primo Volume delle Navigationi et Viaggi, nel qual si contiene « La Descrittione
dell’Africa » (Venice, 1550), at 85: Timbuktu has ‘great richness in plates and bars of gold,
some of which weigh 1,300 pounds’ (author’s own translation).
22 See Smith, supra note 14, at 16.
23 Ibid., at 17–18; T.A. Benjaminsen, G. Berge, and E. Dugan, ‘Myths of Timbuktu: From African
El Dorado to Desertification’, 34 International Journal of Political Economy (2004) 31–59, at 32;
see also Prothero, supra note 16, at 326.
24 See Smith, supra note 14, at 13 and 17–18.
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expectations’.25 Given the surprising level of inactivity he encountered,26
his travel notes shifted focus to the daily life of the population, where he
included descriptions and drawings of the city’s sacred buildings. René
Caillié thereby inadvertently suggested that, by then, what remained of
Timbuktu’s former grandeur was its culture and its heritage.27 One of the
reasons why Timbuktu was added to the World Heritage List in 1988, is
precisely because its sacred buildings ‘bear witness to the golden age of the
intellectual and spiritual capital at the end of the Askia dynasty’.28
B. Current Context
Timbuktu has three mosques — Djingareber, Sidi Yahia and Sankoré — as well
as 16 mausoleums that represent world cultural heritage.29 The daily customs
of Timbuktu’s residents — the population’s beliefs and practices — are deeply
intertwined with the buildings, rendering Timbuktu an example of a city
where the tangible and intangible sides of heritage are interdependent. For
example, it is believed that these buildings form a protective belt around the
city which shields it from misfortune.30 The fate of the sacred buildings have
indeed, to some extent, mirrored that of its population. Timbuktu’s world heri-
tage sites are made of fragile materials that are regularly threatened by desert-
ification, rare but violent bad weather and lack of management plans.31 For
the population, the weather brings periods of droughts and the socio-economic
circumstances do not make it easy to thrive. Many are illiterate and live below
the extreme poverty line,32 a reality that is aggravated by a generalized feeling
of neglect from the central Bamako administration. In 2012, following several
upheavals against the central government with different groups demanding
inclusion in the nation-building process, a secular armed group in the north
(the Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad or MNLA) demanded the full
independence of the Azawad, which is how natives refer to the north of Mali.
The conflict was later hijacked by radical armed groups, including the Ansar
Dine (‘defenders of the faith’) where Mr Al Mahdi served as the chief of the
Hesbah, a morality police in charge of repressing vice.
25 R. Caillié, Travels through Central Africa to Timbuctoo and across the Great Desert, to Morocco,
Performed in the years 1824-1828, vol. 2, chapter XXI (Cambridge University Press, reprinted in
2014), at 49: ‘I looked around and found that the sight before me, did not answer my expect-
ations. I had formed a totally different idea of the grandeur and wealth of Timbuctoo.’
26 Ibid., at 50.
27 Ibid., at 71–76.
28 See ICOMOS, supra note 19, at 3.
29 Ibid., at 37.
30 Ibid.
31 All of these circumstances granted them a place on the List of World Heritage in Danger
between 1990 until 2005. See e.g. Decisions of the 29th Session of the World Heritage
Committee (WHC-05/29.COM/22) UNESCO – World Heritage Committee, July 2005, at 20.
32 US Aid, ‘Mali Country Profile’ (February 2019), available online at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/1860/Country_Profile_Mali_-_Final_19.pdf, at 1–2 (visited 21
November 2020).
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The morality police considered the worshipping of the Saints of Timbuktu a
sign of polytheism and Mr Al Mahdi announced in June 2012 that several
buildings were going to be demolished.33 There were protests on the streets, a
strategy that had saved the similar world heritage site of the Tomb of Askia
(Gao, Mali),34 but did not succeed in Timbuktu. Although 14 shrines were
destroyed by the radicals, Mr Al Mahdi was personally involved in the destruc-
tion of nine mausoleums and the door of the Sidi Yahia mosque.35 The latter
deserves particular attention as it is emblematic of the rapport between the
population of Timbuktu, its cultural heritage, and the fate of this city.
The Sidi Yahia mosque was built in 1440 for the Imam Sidi-Yahia-Et-
Talesi.36 It had always remained closed because, so the prophecy went, open-
ing it would lead to doomsday. Chiding this customary belief as a mere super-
stition, Mr Al Mahdi declared:
We fear that these myths will invade the beliefs of people and the ignorant who, because of
their ignorance and their distance from religion, will think that this is the truth. So we
decided to open it.37
What Mr Al Mahdi achieved, however, was to prove the exact opposite. As a
local individual wisely observed to this author, chaos and the end of the world
did in fact ensue in Timbuktu following the destruction of the Sidi Yahia door.
This is because its destruction took place in a wider context of human rights
abuses, war crimes and crimes against humanity in the form of rape, torture,
mutilations, looting, passing of sentences before the Islamic court without due
process and leading to severe punishments.38 The fate of the Sidi Yahia door
therefore stood, and stands, as an apocalyptic symbol of how radicals took over
Timbuktu between 2012 and 2013.
Mr Al Mahdi was transferred to The Hague in 2015 and prosecuted before
the ICC for his involvement in the war crime of ‘[i]ntentionally directing
33 Judgment and Sentence, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-171), Trial Chamber VIII, 27 September
2016 (‘Al Mahdi Judgment and Sentence’), § 37.
34 The Tomb of Askia is also a world heritage site. Direction Nationale du Patrimoine Culturel,
Rapport: Etat actuel de conservation du site du « Tombeau des Askia » (Ministere de la Culture,
Republique du Mali, 2014), at 2.
35 The current Al Hassan criminal proceedings contain a charge for the war crime of attacking
buildings dedicated to religion and historical buildings (Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) ICCSt.) that fully coin-
cides with the protected buildings for which Mr Al Mahdi was convicted. These are: (i) the Sidi
Mahamoud Ben Omar Mohamed Aquit Mausoleum; (ii) the Sheikh Sidi El Mokhtar Ben Sidi
Mouhammad Al Kabir Al Kounti Mausoleum; (iv) the Alpha Moya Mausoleum; (iv) the Sheikh
Mouhamad El Mikki Mausoleum; (v) the Sheikh Abdoul Kassim Attouaty Mausoleum; (vi) the
Sheikh Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi Mausoleum; (vii) the Sidi Yahia Mosque door; (viii) the
Ahmed Fulane Mausoleum; (ix) the Bahaber Babadie Mausoleum; (x) the Sheikh Mohamed
Mahmoud Al Arawani. ‘Version publique expurgée - Rectificatif à la Décision relative à la
confirmation des charges portées contre Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag
Mahmoud’ (ICC-01/12-01/18-461-Corr-Red), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13 November 2019, § 528.
36 Es Sadi, supra note 13, at 39.
37 Al Mahdi Judgment and Sentence, § 38(viii).
38 See e.g. Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), ‘Situation in Mali: Article 53(1) Report’, 16 January
2013, §§ 46–75.
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attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or char-
itable purposes, historic monuments . . . provided they are not military objec-
tives’.39 He pled guilty and was sentenced to nine years of imprisonment
which he is currently serving in Scotland. Following his conviction in 2016,
the reparations phase began.
The Al Mahdi case bears witness to the fact that the implementation of
reparations involves a series of complex processes before the actual moment
of delivering awards. There is a significant amount of work away from the
courtroom that goes unnoticed and that differs significantly from case to case.
With few existing and remarkably different precedents (i.e. Lubanga, Katanga,
Al Mahdi and, now, Ntaganda), there is little repetition in the implementation of
reparations. In the Al Mahdi case, there was an additional layer of uniqueness
due to the ‘bloodless’ nature of the crime of destruction of cultural heritage:
who were the victims of such type of destruction? The next section examines
the categories of victims identified by the Trial Chamber and the reasoning
behind it.
3. Determining Victimhood in the Al Mahdi Case: Who
Suffers Harm as a Result of Cultural Heritage
Destruction?
When issuing a reparations order, a trial chamber can either directly identify
victims by name or, in the alternative, set down the eligibility criteria for their
identification at a later stage.40
Laying down the eligibility criteria to qualify as a direct victim is a more
straightforward exercise when the crime has been directed against a person as
such (e.g. murder, torture, conscription) or someone’s property (e.g. pillage).
For example, in the Ntaganda case, Trial Chamber VI established that those
eligible for reparations would be the victims of the attacks (which, in turn,
include murder, forcible transfer, rape etc.), former child soldiers, and children
born out of rape and sexual slavery attributable to the convicted.41 The task of
actually locating and identifying all of these persons is an arduous and, per-
haps even nearly impossible task.42 However, establishing on paper who, in
theory, these victims should be is unproblematic because the fact that a, say,
woman has suffered harm as a result of being raped is undisputable. By
39 Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) ICCSt.
40 ‘Judgment on the appeals against the ‘‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be
applied to reparations’’ of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations (Annex A) and
public annexes 1 and 2’, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-3129), Appeals Chamber, 3 March 2015,
§ 32.
41 Reparations Order, Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-2659), Trial Chamber VI, 8 March 2021
(‘Ntaganda Reparations Order’) §§ 108–124.
42 As Trial Chamber VI itself conceded, the ‘exact number (of victims) may never be determined
given the passage of time, the widespread and systematic nature of the crimes committed’, see
Ntaganda Reparations Order, § 8.







qab064/6428099 by guest on 16 N
ovem
ber 2021
contrast, determining who suffers harm as a result of the destruction of a
monument is not as self-evident.
The Katanga case had been the only one where reparations incorporated an
aspect of crimes against objects (e.g. pillage of dwellings, houseware, cattle).
However, this still did not provide much guidance to the Al Mahdi Trial
Chamber because there would be a certain incongruence in comparing the
loss of someone’s hut with that of a cultural site of outstanding universal value.43
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights had acknowledged harm to a
peoples’ culture in several cases,44 but such harm had ensued from attacks
directed at persons, not at objects. For example, in the Massacre of Plan
Sánchez v. Guatemala (2004), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found
that the massacres and scorched earth operations carried out against the Achı́
indigenous community led to the complete destruction of their culture and had
caused a cultural vacuum.45 Mr Al Mahdi, however, was convicted only for the
destruction of cultural objects, an unparalleled circumstance in the realm of
mass atrocities and international criminal justice. The precedent was thus not
there, and there were no examples to draw from.
The Al Mahdi Trial Chamber received submissions and observations
from four appointed independent experts, including this author’s;46
amici curiae submissions from five organizations including UNESCO;47
the Prosecution,48 the Defence team,49 the legal representative of
43 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (‘World
Heritage Convention’), preamble, sixth recital. All protected buildings mentioned in the Al
Mahdi case, except one, are part of the World Heritage List.
44 ‘Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs’, Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., 15 June 2005, § 86(18) and (20). In the Lhaka case, which is posterior to the Al
Mahdi case, the Inter-American Court recognized the connection between the right of an
indigenous people to enjoy their culture and their ability to make use of their ancestral land,
and condemned Argentina for having violated the interrelated rights of the indigenous com-
munity to take part in its cultural life and to a healthy environment. See ‘Merits, reparations
and costs’, Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat (our land) Association v. Argentina, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., 6 February 2020, §§ 231–289.
45 Merits, Judgment, Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) no. 105, 29
April 2004, §§ 42(1) and 87. The attacks prevented them from continuing their ancestral
traditions, performing the community’s funeral rites, and broke the transmission of oral heri-
tage to the newer generations, causing a cultural vacuum.
46 First Expert Report, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-214-AnxI-Red3), 27 April 2017; Second
Expert Report, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-214-AnxII-Red2), 28 April 2020; and Third Joint
Expert Report, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-214-AnxIII-Red2), 4 August 2017 (‘Third Expert
Report’).
47 Queen’s University Belfast Human Rights Centre and the Redress Trust observations pursuant to
Article 75(3) of the Statute and Rule 103 of the Rules, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-188), 2
December 2016; Joint observations of FIDH and AMDH on the reparations proceedings, Al
Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-189-tENG), 2 December 2016; UNESCO Amicus Curiae Observations,
Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-194), 2 December 2016.
48 Prosecution’s Submissions on Reparations, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-192-Red), 2 December
2016.
49 General Defence observations on reparations, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-191-tENG), 2
December 2016; Final Submissions of the Defence for Mr Al Mahdi in Anticipation of the
Order for Reparations, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-226-Conf-tENG).
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victims,50 the Registry and the Trust Fund for Victims.51 After their own
deliberations, Trial Chamber VIII issued the Al Mahdi reparations order on
17 August 2017 wherein it found four concentric groups of victims, from
broader to narrower: (i) the international community and (ii) Malian
nationals, (iii) Timbuktu’s local population and, (iv) within it, certain indi-
viduals who bore a special relationship with the protected buildings.
As a side note, it appears that Mr Al Mahdi had a remarkably accurate idea
of what groups his crime had affected. On occasion of his guilty plea, Mr Al
Mahdi apologized stating:
I am really sorry, I am really remorseful and I regret all the damage that my actions have
caused. I regret what I have caused to my family, my community in Timbuktu, what I have
caused my home nation, Mali, and I’m really remorseful about what I had caused the
international community as a whole.52
A. The International Community and the Malian Population at Large
The Al Mahdi Trial Chamber found that the concept of ‘outstanding universal
value’,53 a definitional element of world heritage sites, was strongly tied to the
international community that deems such sites important. It found that the
destruction of cultural heritage:
[C]arries a message of terror and helplessness; it destroys part of humanity’s shared memory
and collective consciousness; and it renders humanity unable to transmit its values and
knowledge to future generations. It is an irreplaceable loss that negates humanity.54
Years earlier, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
passing judgment on the shelling of the world heritage site of Dubrovnik, had
made similar remarks:
The whole of the Old Town of Dubrovnik was considered, at the time of the events con-
tained in the Indictment, an especially important part of the world cultural heritage. It was,
among other things, an outstanding architectural ensemble illustrating a significant stage in
human history. The shelling attack on the Old Town was an attack not only against the
history and heritage of the region, but also against the cultural heritage of humankind.55
The Al Mahdi judges then pointed to the population of Mali as the next
victimized group, on account of the loss that their national heritage.
Timbuktu was a national protected site and central to the history of Mali.
As a Bamako-based woman once commented: ‘Tombouctou est à voir, on ne
50 Registry’s observations pursuant to Trial Chamber VIII’s Decision ICC-01/12-01/15-172 of 29
September 2016, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-193), 2 December 2016.
51 TFV’s Submissions on the reparations proceedings, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-187), 2
December 2016; and TFV’s Final Submissions on the reparations proceedings, Al Mahdi (ICC-
01/12-01/15-225), 16 June 2017.
52 Transcript of Hearing, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-T-4-Red-ENG), 22 August 2016, at 8, lines
13–16.
53 Art. 1 of the World Heritage Convention.
54 Al Mahdi Reparations Order, § 22.
55 Judgment, Jokić (IT-01-42/1-S), Trial Chamber I, 18 March 2004, § 51.
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peut pas comprendre l’histoire du Mali sans Tombouctou’ (i.e. Timbuktu is to be
seen, one cannot understand the history of Mali without Timbuktu).
Therefore, the Trial Chamber concluded that the destruction of the protected
buildings in Timbuktu had affected the members of the international commu-
nity and the Malian population. Both had suffered collective moral harm that
ought to be acknowledged through the awarding of one symbolic euro to
UNESCO, in representation of the international community; and another
euro to the Malian government, acting on behalf of the national population.56
The official ceremony to this effect was held on 30 March 2021.57
B. The Population of Timbuktu
The tangible and intangible cultural heritage of Timbuktu are two sides of the
same coin.58 The mausoleums and mosques were an integral part of the
population’s shared beliefs and identity. ‘[J]ust as everywhere in the Islamic
world, daily life [was] regulated by the times of prayer.’59 Prior to the attack,
the local population would visit the mausoleums to ask the Saints’ divine
intervention in (or thank them for) finding a job or a suitable spouse, conceiv-
ing a child, improving one’s health etc.
Conversations with local individuals provided mixed information as to
whether women were or not allowed inside the mausoleums. While a definitive
answer was never given, it was once observed that only little girls or women of
age may be allowed inside. This could be taken to indicate that women in the
reproductive age are barred from accessing the interior of Timbuktu’s sacred
buildings, an interpretation which was consistent with some women’s
accounts that they prayed from the surroundings of the mausoleum or from
home.
Regardless of gender, there was a certain uniformity in how locals described
the way the destruction had affected them. They would speak of ‘shattered
faith’, fear, shock, devastation and humiliation.60 In their culture, resort to the
Saints was a form of psychological well-being and that in the absence of that
possibility, their mental health had deteriorated. As expressed in the combined
report of two of the appointed experts:
All these rituals were suddenly broken and, from a psychological point of view, people no
longer know who to commend themselves to. Thus, with each blow of the pickaxe that
56 Al Mahdi Reparations Order, §§ 106–107.
57 See e.g. ‘ICC holds reparations ceremony for Timbuktu mausoleums’, ABC News, 30 March
2021.
58 According to the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage
intangible cultural heritage means ‘the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills
— as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith — that
communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural
heritage’.
59 Making this observation about neighbouring Djenné, see G. Mommersteeg, In the city of
Marabouts: Islamic Culture in West Africa (Waveland Press, 2012), at 59.
60 Al Mahdi Reparations Order, § 85.
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destroyed these mausoleums, it was a blow to the heart which was brought to the people of
Timbuktu. It was more than a humiliation, it was a physical attack on the very heart of the
population.61
UNESCO managed to rebuild the mausoleums and the door of the Sidi Yahia
mosque in 2015, which is rather laudable given the uncertain security situ-
ation of northern Mali. Yet, some locals did not equate the reconstruction with
the reestablishment of their spiritual power.62
In addition to the disruption to their daily customs, since 2012, the town
had been unable to celebrate the Mawlid festival that commemorated the
birthday of the Islamic prophet and allowed the recreation of the atmosphere
of the city at the height of its glory.63 Likewise, the Festival au Désert has been
continuously cancelled. The event, held yearly, was considered an expression
of culture in Timbuktu where artists performed and business was made. This is
to show that the destruction of Timbuktu’s heritage brought about a general
decline to both the spiritual and economic life of the city.
The Al Mahdi judges therefore established that the community of Timbuktu
as a whole had suffered harm in the form of mental pain, anguish, the dis-
ruption of culture as well as generalized economic harm.64 They ordered ‘col-
lective reparations through rehabilitation to address the emotional distress’65
and ‘collective reparations should be aimed at rehabilitating the community of
Timbuktu in order to address the economic harm caused’.66 Moreover, they
also stated that such collective reparations could ‘include symbolic measures
— such as a memorial, commemoration or forgiveness ceremony — to give
public recognition of the moral harm suffered by the Timbuktu community and
those within it’.67
C. Certain Individuals with a Closer Connection to the Protected Buildings
While the mausoleums and mosques played a central role in the living tissue of
Timbuktu, there were certain individuals within the local population whose
connection to the protected buildings was more intimate: those whose live-
lihoods depended on their existence prior to their destruction, and those who
were the direct descendants of the Saints buried in them. Both groups were
considered to have suffered a more acute level of, respectively, economic and
moral harm, and are the only ones entitled to receive monetary individual
compensation.68
61 Third Expert Report, at 146 (own translation from French).
62 Ibid., at 147.
63 For an account of how this festival is celebrated in neighbouring Djenné, see Mommersteg,
supra note 59, at 22.
64 Al Mahdi Reparations Order, § 76.
65 Ibid., § 90.
66 Ibid., § 83.
67 Ibid., § 90.
68 Al Mahdi Reparations Order, §§ 83 and 89.
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From the economic side of things, when the locals and pilgrims visited the
mausoleums, they would leave donations. The money collected was divided by
the family in charge of the protected building (i.e. the prominent family) to pay
a living allowance to themselves for managing the site, and to provide a wage
to those persons involved in the maintenance of the building.
The physical maintenance and rehabilitation of the mausoleums and mos-
ques is essential due to Timbuktu’s unforgiving weather, characterized by
strong winds, desert storms and a three-month long rainy season lasting
from June until September. In this context, the role performed by masons is
key. Each building has a trusted mason whose ancestral techniques are handed
down orally from father to son. Being a mason is therefore not only a reput-
able occupation, but also a form of unique intangible heritage: ‘[n]o one can
touch a mausoleum or a mosque without them . . . . The maçon is the one who
rebuilds and also the one who re-confers the buildings its sacred character.’69
Likewise, the guardians have an intimate link with the life of the mauso-
leums. They tend to be members of a prominent family, often its head, and
they serve as keepers of the key. Given this customary connection to the
buildings, the Court afforded them a factual presumption of exclusive economic
dependence and granted them monetary compensation, as long as they could
prove that they were indeed the mason or guardian of a given protected
building.70
Aside from masons and guardians, the Court extended individual reparations
to anyone who could establish an ‘exclusive economic link’71 by means of their
profession. This would encompass owners and employees of businesses with
purposes strictly linked to the existence of the protected buildings, such as the
women who used to sell and lend jewellery around the mausoleums for special
celebrations, and those who made a living out of selling holy sand from their
soil. It would not cover owners of restaurants or lodgings for visitors because
such businesses — while affected by their disappearance — could exist without
the sites.
Requests to receive monetary compensation are done through individual
applications72 submitted with supporting evidence of the exclusive economic
link. Registries and any sort of official record-keeping do not exist in Timbuktu.
This documentary deficit is not exclusive to the situation in Mali and similar
circumstances arose for the Court in relation to the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) with Lubanga, Katanga and Ntaganda. As a result, the Court has
adopted a flexible approach whereby it admits alternative forms of proof as
69 C. Bozonnet, ‘Les gens qui veulent détruire ne gagnent pas’, Goude News, 21 June 2014,
available online at http://goude-news.overblog.com/2014/06/les-gens-qui-veulent-detruire-ne-
gagnent-pas.html (visited 23 November 2020).
70 Public redacted version of ‘‘Decision on Trust Fund for Victims’ Draft Implementation Plan for
Reparations’’, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-273-Red), Trial Chamber VIII, 12 July 2018, § 62
(‘Decision on the DIP’).
71 Al Mahdi Reparations Order § 81.
72 Decision on the DIP, §§ 30–49.
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valid, such as systems of attestation and accounts corroborated by credible
witnesses.73
From a psychological point of view, the direct descendants of the Saints were
considered to have suffered a heightened degree of moral harm because the
shrine and peace of their ancestors had been disrupted. They too are entitled to
monetary compensation which needs to be requested through system of indi-
vidual applications.74 While the Saints buried in the mausoleums lived hun-
dreds of years ago, their descendant lines persist and are widely recognized by
the community. In other words, who is a descendant of each Saint is known
and largely undisputed in the community of Timbuktu. The amount awarded
to these individuals will remain confidential to avoid targeted attacks.
However, it should be noted that, as instructed by Trial Chamber VIII, the
sums are not symbolic but aim to represent an actual compensation for the
harm suffered.75
Trial Chamber VIII directed the TFV to, under its oversight, draft and im-
plement the reparations on the basis of the victim eligibility criteria and the
measures identified in the reparations order. However, partly due to the unique
character of this case and the fact that some issues are hard to anticipate, the
implementation of reparations encountered three distinct challenges, two of
which were connected to the individual reparations of direct descendants of
the Saints. They are labelled ‘monumental’ challenges because they had one
thing in common: the amount of theoretical thinking and reflection that they
deserved was inversely proportionate to the urgency with which they had to
be addressed. Not only was there time pressure to set the process in motion
promptly, there was also pressure coming from knowing that reparations in Al
Mahdi would set a precedent.
4. Monumental Challenges
These challenges could not be left to improvization. Drawing from this author’s
academic background, the Trust Fund for Victims adopted a strategy consisting
in building a bridge with scholars. A diverse pool of academics specialized in
psychology, anthropology, human rights, and the politics of cultural heritage
management76 generously donated their time and expertise. The way in which
this author could navigate certain issues central to the implementation of
reparations in Al Mahdi was largely enabled by the views and advice provided
by these specialists. Their names, very unfortunately, cannot be recalled here
73 See e.g. Trust Fund for Victims, ‘Public redacted version of ‘‘Trust Fund for Victims’ submission
of draft application form’’ ICC-01/12-01/15-289-Conf submitted on 26 October 2018’, Al
Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-289-Red), 30 October 2018, § 45 (‘TFV Submission of Draft
Application Form’). See e.g. Ntaganda Reparations Order, §§ 136–139.
74 Decision on the DIP, §§ 30–49.
75 Ibid., § 73.
76 Lesser public redacted version of ‘‘Updated Implementation Plan’’ submitted on 2 November
2018 ICC-01/12-01/15-291-Conf-Exp’, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-291-Red3), Trust Fund for
Victims, 14 October 2019, §§ 26 and 30 (‘TFV Updated Implementation Plan’).
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for confidentiality and security reasons. However, the fact that their work and
expertise existed should be credited and acknowledged.
A. First Monumental Challenge: the Unborn Generations
The Al Mahdi reparations order had identified ‘those whose ancestors’ burial sites
were damaged in the attack (such as the ’descendants of the Saints’’)’ as one of
the categories of victims entitled to compensation.77 However, it did not specify
a cut-off date of birth for such descendants to be included in the pool of victims.
Laws for the protection of cultural heritage exist precisely based on the premise
that cultural sites belong to humankind and ought to be preserved for their
transmission to future generations.78 The question thus arose: considering that
this case only involved the loss of cultural heritage, should the concept of direct
descendants of the Saints be extended to unborn generations of those families?
Around the time this issue was being discussed, an ICC decision in the
Katanga case dealt with transgenerational transmission of trauma of children.
The question arose in relation to children born after the attack perpetrated
against Bogoro, for which Mr Katanga was found responsible. Trial Chamber II
defined transgenerational harm as ‘a phenomenon, whereby social violence is
passed on from ascendants to descendants with traumatic consequences for the
latter’79 in a way that the trauma suffered by the parents influences the be-
haviour of their children.80 The Katanga Trial Chamber ended up dismissing
the claims of transgenerational harm because the causal nexus between psy-
chological harm and the attack had not been established81 as there could have
been other unrelated events contributing to the trauma of the parents.82
By contrast, Mr Al Mahdi’s crime is the direct reason why future generations
of direct descendants will not get to see their ancestors’ shrines. When Mr Al
Mahdi, along with others, participated in the destruction, he forever impeded
the possibility of passing this heritage on. Even though some sites had been
rebuilt under the auspices of UNESCO in 2015, a reconstructed building is
never the same as the original one.83 Therefore, a strong argument could be
made that Mr Al Mahdi’s actions caused harm to unborn children.
77 Al Mahdi Reparations Order, § 89.
78 See e.g. 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage World, Art. 4: ‘Each State Party to this Convention recognizes that the duty of
ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future
generations.’
79 Public Redacted Version of Decision on the Matter of the Transgenerational Harm Alleged by
Some Applicants for Reparations Remanded by the Appeals Chamber in its Judgment of 8
March 2018, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3804-Red-tENG), Trial Chamber II, 19 July 2018, §
10.
80 Ibid., § 11. Transgenerational harm as a category of harm has been included in the Ntaganda
reparations principles, see Ntaganda Reparations Order, § 73.
81 Ibid., § 56.
82 Ibid., § 31.
83 D. Viejo-Rose and M.L. Stig Sørensen, ‘Cultural Heritage and Armed Conflict: New Questions for
an Old Relationship’, in E. Waterton and S. Watson (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of
Contemporary Heritage Research (Palgrave, 2015) 281–296, at 287.
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Extending compensation to the unborn generations of descendants of the
Saints could be defensible as far as cultural heritage considerations are con-
cerned. But this decision could not be taken in a vacuum. In the broader
context where this was being evaluated, there were arguments against extend-
ing compensation to future generations. First, unborn generations at large may
stretch the limits of the ICC’s definition of victims as ‘natural persons’ in Rule
85(a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). While there are different
schools of thought concerning what grants personhood (i.e. some of them
emphasizing rational capabilities, and others, the fact of constituting a ‘human
being’) they all seem to operate on the assumption that they must be existing
and concrete beings.84 This was in line with a decision by the ICC that states
that the deceased cannot be considered ‘natural persons’.85 However, it should
be noted that the Ntaganda reparations order, which was issued around two
years after this discussion concerning Al Mahdi was being held, has recently
labelled children born out of rape and sexual slavery as direct victims of Mr
Ntaganda’s crimes.86 Does this mean that the nasciturus, as an unborn but
concrete being, could qualify as a natural person in the sense of Rule 85(a)
RPE? While this question did not come up as such in Ntaganda because these
victims are now adults, it is not entirely clear when these children born out of
rape and sexual slavery became direct victims: at the time of conception, at
some point during the pregnancy, or when they were born? This development
casts new doubts as to whether being unborn at the time of the commission of
the crime is relevant to the understanding of ‘natural person’ pursuant to Rule
85(a) RPE.
Secondly, in a tightly knit population where the value of the community and
sharing prevails over individualism and privacy, awarding monetary compen-
sation for years on end to a selected group could provoke jealousy and com-
munal tensions. The prolonged flux of income to children being born in the
descendant families would be in stark contrast with the fixed time-length
planned for the reparative programmes addressed to the wider population of
Timbuktu (i.e. three years on average).87 This disparity could contribute to the
perception of these families as being privileged and ultimately, cause their
alienation and that of their children from the community. Moreover, an argu-
ment can be made that, if Mr Al Mahdi caused harm to the future generations,
certainly this was not limited to the unborn children of the descendants, but to
those of the other pools of victims as well, which would require redefining the
boundaries of the reparations order altogether.
84 C. Foster and J. Herring, Identity, Personhood and the Law (Springer, 2017), at 22–27.
85 Corrigendum to Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants
a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to a/0038/
07, Situation in Darfur - Sudan (ICC-02/05-111-Corr), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 14 December 2007,
§ 36; see also H. Dumont, ‘Requirements for Victim Participation’, in K. Tibori-Szábo and M.
Hirst (eds), Victims Participation in International Criminal Justice: Practioner’s Guide (T.M.C. Asser
Press, 2017) 45–80, at 53–55.
86 Ntaganda Reparations Order, §§ 120–123.
87 TFV Updated Implementation Plan, §§ 49, 109 and 136.
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After careful consideration of the principles in play and practical implica-
tions, the TFV opted for establishing a cut-off date coinciding with the time of
the attack, that is, 11 July 2012.88 Therefore, descendants of the Saints born
after that date will not be eligible for individual compensation. Yet, along with
all other children from Timbuktu or born outside within displaced families,
they will be able to benefit from collective programmes even if born after
the attack.
B. Second Challenge: Women’s Role in Compensation
The task of identifying direct descendants of the Saints brought to the fore
tensions that are latent in the ICC framework for reparations. The set of
principles applicable to reparations (then, the Lubanga principles)89 instruct
the Court to avoid creating tensions within the community and, to the extent
possible, to reflect customary practices in implementing reparations.90 At the
same time, a duty exists to address underlying injustices and avoid replicating
structural discrimination.91 These two values came into conflict in Al Mahdi
because the Timbuktu community is customarily organized along very defined
gender roles. Therein, the concept of descendancy is male-driven, whereby the
female identity is absorbed by that of the man when she marries into his
family. This meant that the ancestral links between Timbuktu women and
the Saints had been eroded generation after generation. Should the duty to
actively address discrimination prevail over that of avoiding tensions and
respecting local practices? And, if so, how could these women-lines of descend-
ancy be found in the absence of genealogical records?
The inequality of women in Timbuktu is part of a wider context. The
Malian Constitution proclaims equality between men and women.92
However, a closer look into Malian Family Law shows how women are
largely under the authority of the male. For example, the husband is the
head of the family, he ‘chooses the place of residence where his wife is
‘‘obligated’’ to live’93 and ‘male children inherit twice the amount allotted
to female children’.94 In 2009, a reform of the Family Code which advanced
women’s rights was sent back to the Malian Parliament for a second
88 TFV Submission of Draft Application Form, § 43.
89 Note that these principles have been amended in the Ntaganda Reparations Order issued in
March 2021. See Ntaganda Reparations Order, §§ 28–103.
90 Annex A to ‘Judgment on the appeals against the ‘‘Decision establishing the principles and
procedures to be applied to reparations’’ of 7 August 2012 with Amended order for reparations
(Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2’, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA), Appeals
Chamber, 3 March 2015 (‘Lubanga Reparations Principles’), §§ 33 and 47.
91 Ibid., § 17. The Ntaganda reparations principles reproduce these ideas concerning the need to
avoid tensions, tackle discrimination, and respect customary practices in Ntaganda Reparations
Order §§ 44 and 90.
92 Art. 2, 1992 Malian Constitution.
93 B.F. Soares, ‘The Attempt to Reform Family Law in Mali’, 49 Die Welt des Islams (2009) 398–
428, at 407.
94 Ibid., at 409.
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reading following mass protests by a conservative religious sector.95 The
revised text undercut women’s right to such an extent that, in 2018, the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights ruled that the Code violated
international human rights.96
The understanding of descendancy lines in Timbuktu as being male-headed
was the discriminatory practice that most touched upon the delivery of repar-
ations and thus, had to be tackled. Legal and ethical arguments supported the
conclusion that women had to be recipients of this award on an equal footing
to men. Legally, the principle according to which local customs must be
respected contains a caveat of doing so only whenever possible and unless
the practice in question is discriminatory. Moreover, there is explicit wording
concerning monetary compensation that requires that awards be delivered in a
gender-inclusive manner.97 Ethically, excluding female lines of descendancy
deriving from the Saint would have amounted to either accepting that women
suffer less moral harm than men, or that their suffering counts less, both of
which would have been indefensible. In addition, the United Nations Special
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Karima Bennoune, pursuant to her
appointment as expert in the Al Mahdi case, cautioned that ‘the struggle for
women’s rights is an essential component of the fight against all forms of
extremism . . . which is yet another reason . . . to take a gender sensitive per-
spective to reparations in this case’.98 As such, the Al Mahdi implementation of
reparations followed her advice that ‘[t]he gender component [was] not
optional’.99
Instead, the difficulty could have been in galvanizing the support of the
heads of families and local intermediaries, who are almost exclusively male.
They could have opposed the extension to female-based lines on account of, for
example, being a secular foreign imposition or because of an (erroneous) im-
pression that the sum of monetary award would be reduced proportionately to
the increase of persons in the pool of victims entitled to compensation. An
eventual rejection of the inclusion of women as recipients of these awards,
could have thwarted the legitimacy of the entire process and the participation
of certain segments of the local population. Moreover, in the absence of ge-
nealogical trees or any official family records, the cooperation of the male-lines
of descendancy was key to reach female-based lines. If the male heads of
families had refused to answer questions such as ‘do you have sisters, do
you have aunts?’,100 the task of ensuring that reparations reached all relevant
95 International Federation for Human Rights, ‘Mali’s new Family Law: women’s rights denied,
discrimination upheld’, 9 December 2011, available online at https://www.fidh.org/en/region/
Africa/mali/Mali-s-new-Family-Law-women-s (visited 23 November 2020).
96 Judgment of 11 May 2018, APDF and IHRDA v. Republic of Mali (046/2016), African Court
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, §§ 78, 94, 95, 114, 115, 124 and 125. For a commentary on
the judgment, see International Justice Resource Center, ‘African Court finds Mali’s family law
violates human rights obligations’, 29 May 2018.
97 Lubanga Reparations Principles, §§ 47 and 38.
98 First Expert Report, at 35.
99 Ibid.
100 TFV Submission of Draft Application Form, § 39.
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recipients would have been daunting, and its implementation, socially compli-
cated. Fortunately, it did not come to this. After numerous exchanges with
intermediaries and heads of families, it was accepted that reparations are
governed by certain legal principles that require a gender-inclusive approach,
and cooperation ensued.
C. Third Challenge: to Memorialize or Not Memorialize
The Trial Chamber deferred the decision of adopting memorialization measures
to the TFV.101 The significance of memorialization measures — or any sym-
bolic measures for that matter102 — is easily underestimated because, unlike
compensation, they lack an instant monetary or tangible expression. For ex-
ample, in the context of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, it has
been noted that ‘symbolic reparation, especially memorialization practices,
lacks adequate conceptual elaboration, and its potential remains underutilized.
This often results . . . in ineffective, even detrimental monuments’.103
Something similar could have happened in the Al Mahdi implementation
since, motivated by the urge to deliver visible results, there were voices pro-
posing an erection of a memorialization monument in Timbuktu. Cautions
were conveyed that decisions around memorialization had to be approached
with circumspection. This is because memorialization measures engage into a
dialogue with the past where new meaning is constructed.104 Co-existing
groups may understand their message differently.105 Moreover, at some point
more or less distant in the future, memorialization sites can become the subject
of contestation and conflict.106 Thus, memorialization measures are as power-
ful as they are delicate, and any decision concerning their appropriateness had
to be treated with extreme care. Here, consulting the matter with experts
became essential.
Some of the consulted academics cautioned against a top-down approach
where decisions would be taken in The Hague; otherwise, the project could be
101 Al Mahdi Reparations Order, § 90.
102 On the different types of symbolic reparations, see Symbolic Reparations Research Project,
Guidelines on the Use of Art in Symbolic Reparations (2017) at 2, available online at https://
issuu.com/symbolicreparations/docs/srrp_guidelines-letterhead.engl__2_) (visited 24 May
2021).
103 R.A. Greeley et al., ‘Repairing Symbolic Reparations: Assessing the Effectiveness of
Memorialization in the InterAmerican System of Human Rights’, 14 International Journal of
Transitional Justice (2020) 165–192, at 167.
104 E. Kamel-Ahmed, ‘What to Conserve? Heritage, Memory, and Management of Meanings’, 9
International Journal of Architectural Research (2015) 67–76, at 73.
105 D. Viejo-Rose, ‘Memorial Functions: Intent, Impact and the Right to Remember’, 4 Memory
Studies (2011) 465–480, at 472.
106 L. Moffett, D. Viejo Rose and R. Hickey, ‘Shifting the Paradigm on Cultural Property and
Heritage in International Law and Armed Conflict: Time to Talk about Reparations?’ 26
International Journal of Heritage Studies (2019) 1–17, at 9; see also, K. Hodgkin, and S.
Radstone, ‘Introduction’, in K. Hodgkin, and S. Radstone (eds), Contested Pasts: The Politics
of Memory (Routlegde, 2003) 1–21.
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rejected, accused of partiality and its meaning could be contested.107 For ex-
ample, the destruction of the Mostar bridge in the Balkan War (1993) stood as
a symbol of the collapse in communication between the two peoples it con-
nected, Bosniaks and Croats.108 The way it was reconstructed was, however,
the result of foreign intervention spearheaded by the World Bank and UNESCO.
The ‘international tender for the reconstruction works on the Old Bridge was
won by the Turkish company’109 and the preliminary project was prepared by
a Florence-based studio.110 The new bridge subsequently fell short of ‘recon-
structing, by extension, the links of trust and communication between the
town’s communities’,111 casting doubts about whether this reconstruction
should have taken place and if so, how it should have been done.
Learning from these past lessons and the advice provided, the TFV developed
the concept of ‘restorative agency’,112 a principle that it has used since Al
Mahdi to make sure that victims are given a platform to decide, not a decision.
It entails a paradigm shift that tries to move away from the risk of ‘re-silencing
victims negating their potential for agency and reproducing the sense of
powerless’,113 and instead ensures that victims are ‘integrated from the start
in determining the nature, objectives and forms of symbolic reparations’.114
Under this principle, victims should be invited to become active actors in the
shaping of any memorialization measure, and to decide what specific course of
action (including non-memorialization) serves a higher restorative function for
them. In sum, there is no emphasis on achieving a specific result, but on the
existence of process that ‘should transform the victim into an active participant
and beneficiary’.115
The principle of restorative agency includes two dimensions: one formal,
consisting of ensuring that the process provides a safe and inclusive space
for the victims to hold discussions and take decisions; and one substantive,
consisting of ensuring that the discussions they hold lead to reflect upon the
traumatic event, and the type of presence and meaning victims would want to
afford it for the future.
Applied to the Al Mahdi case, the formal aspect required taking into account
that the community in Timbuktu is organized along very distinct lines of age
107 TFV Updated Implementation Plan, § 161.
108 D. Viejo-Rose, ‘Reconstructing Heritage in the Aftermath of Civil War: Re-Visioning the
Nation and the Implications of International Involvement’, 7 Journal of Intervention and
Statebuilding (2013) 125–148, at 113.
109 I. Colak, ‘The Reconstruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar’, 15 DAAAM International Scientific
Book (2016) 151–162, at 157.
110 Ibid.
111 Viejo-Rose, supra note 108, at 113.
112 The ‘restorative agency’ principle seems to have been welcomed by recent literature speci-
alized in heritage management, see C. Joy, Heritage Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2020),
at 39–40.
113 K. McEvoy and K. McConnachie, ‘Victims and Transitional Justice: Voice, Agency and Blame’,
22 Social & Legal Studies (2013) 489–513, at 498.
114 See Greeley et al., supra note 103, at 188.
115 Symbolic Reparations Research Project, supra note 112, at 4.
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and gender. As a result, mixing all of members of this community into one sole
discussion group would have effectively meant silencing some voices, most
prominently that of women and the youth. Moreover, the source of contest-
ation of memorialization measures does not often stem from ‘conflicting
accounts of what actually happened . . . so much as [from] the question of
who is entitled to speak for that past in the present’.116 Therefore, the TFV
proposed creating six memorialization committees corresponding to (i) young
adult men; (ii) young adult women; (iii) elderly men; (iv) elderly women; (v)
children; and (vi) the displaced population. Each committee is meant to inde-
pendently deal with the substantive questions posed (see below). Then, a ‘rep-
resentative from each one of the groups would examine together in a supra-
committee whether any of their proposals can be joined. If not, they would be
implemented independently’.117
As to the substantive dimension of the principle, the committees are not
meant to gather once in a solemn occasion to adopt a one-off decision. They
are instead supposed to engage into conversation to discuss and decide on
three discrete questions: whether, what and how to memorialize.118
Whether to memorialize should be the first key question to address. Both
putting in place a memorialization measure and choosing not to do so are
equally forms of action. Some groups may prefer some sort of wilful amnesia so
as not to make the disruptive event a constant present in their lives. Past
experiences have proved this. In the Katanga case, victims ‘specifically rejected
. . . commemorative events, broadcasts of the trial, the erection of monu-
ments’119 on the grounds that they would be ‘unsuitable or pointless, or could
cause fresh trauma or exacerbate social unrest’.120 Other groups may regard
memorialization or any symbolic measures futile if there is not an instant
return coming from it. For example, in Ntaganda, victims were not favourable
to symbolic reparations unless they incorporated a ‘practical purpose’.121
Deciding what to memorialize is central to the concrete message that victims
want to convey. Past common traumatic events may trigger ‘different associ-
ations and feelings’.122 ‘What’ to memorialize entails prioritizing some memo-
ries and associations over others. For example, a group may want to
commemorate the crime of destruction of cultural heritage and the feeling of
helplessness and despair, whereas another may prefer to shift attention to the
moment of reconstruction and focus on messages around community
resilience.
How to memorialize entails discussing whether the measure should be tan-
gible, non-tangible, specific in time, recurring or permanent. For example,
116 K. Hodgkin and S. Radstone, supra note 106, at 1.
117 TFV Updated Implementation Plan, § 162.
118 TFV Updated Implementation Plan, § 161.
119 Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-
tENG), Trial Chamber II, 24 March 2017, § 301.
120 Ibid.
121 Ntaganda Reparations Order, § 9.
122 B.A. Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering (Mc-Graw Hill, 2003), at 11.
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memorials carved ‘in stone are ... a Western tradition not globally shared’.123
Carving a message in stone, naming a street, or erecting a statue, are also
forms of memorialization that intend to be immutable and permanent. In con-
trast, groups may favour episodic forms of memorialization such as a one-off
performance, a remembrance day, or an annual festival. Thus, how to memor-
ialize is an important decision because itmodulates the presence and intensity
of the past in the present and future.
The role of the TFV in this scenario is meant to sit at the margin of the
discussion and in no way should it be understood as being an actor involved in
the actual discussion. Its role would be limited to examining the final proposals
of the committees, if any, just ensure that they are connected to Mr Al Mahdi’s
crime and stay within the budget of EUR 24,000 per committee.124 In prin-
ciple, there is no limit to how many times the committees can meet, as long as
they stay within the given timeframe and budget.
5. Conclusion
Each reparations case comes with its own in-built uniqueness: different list of
charges, different area, local customs and internal dynamics among the
affected population. At this stage in the lifespan of reparations at the Court,
there is little repetition and monotony in how reparations are implemented.
The implementation process therefore comes with questions that are as theor-
etically complex as practically relevant. Quick answers and quick solutions,
while very much needed, are not readily available and there is still a steep
learning curve. This article provides three illustrative examples of how this
played out in the Al Mahdi case, which had the added layer of complexity of
involving cultural heritage destruction alone.
The strategy adopted in Al Mahdi involved seeking ad hoc expert knowledge
to ensure that there was a thick framework of reference to propose informed
measures to the Trial Chamber. However, the time is arriving where some
scenarios are bound to re-appear and complex questions will not sound that
foreign anymore. For example, there is a partial overlap in the conviction
against Lubanga and Ntaganda for recruiting and conscripting child soldiers;
the charges in the Al Hassan case include the destruction of the same protected
buildings for which Mr Al Mahdi was convicted; the Ntaganda case is the first
one with a pronounced gender component but, in all probability, not the last,
and so forth. Knowing this, it would be advisable that the Court, and especially
the TFV, make a conscious effort and take concrete steps to build an institu-
tional memory around reparations of the issues encountered, the strategy
adopted, and the lessons learnt along the way. The Independent Expert
123 Moffett, Viejo Rose and Hickey, supra note 106, at 9.
124 TFV Updated Implementation Plan, §§ 163 and 165.
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Review of the ICC noticed the lack of guidelines on the reparations process and
recommended the creation of a document for the sake of coherence and ex-
pediency.125 A document of the sort (e.g. a reparations practice manual)
would also ensure resorting to outside experts only when necessary.
Otherwise, in the long run, there would be a risk of duplicating work, achiev-
ing disparate solutions, extending the process longer than necessary, and
draining resources. Moreover, making this document public to the extent pos-
sible, would provide a platform to receive feedback and engage in discussions
with wider audiences which, in exchange, would be made aware of the com-
plexities beneath the surface of reparations.
The time of having it all figured out in the implementation of reparations has
not yet come, and perhaps never will entirely, but keeping a record of these issues
is a definitive step towards achieving better processes and better results. This
article has tried to provide a modest initial contribution to this end.
125 Independent Expert Review of the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute System,
‘Final Report’, 30 September 2020, § 927, available online at https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
asp_docs/ASP19/IER-Final-Report-ENG.pdf (visited 24 September 2021).
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